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1 Pervasive Monitoring is a Myth
Pervasive monitoring does not exist for one good reason: if monitoring does
happen, as revealed by recent whistleblowing that highlighted the scale of NSA
surveillance activities [1], it happens in very few key central locations in the
network. Monitoring, as we know it so far, is thus by no means pervasive in
the geographical or topological sense. One might further speculate that such
monitoring will probably never become pervasive because it would simply be
too expensive to put in place.
This observation leads to a fundamental question: how could NSA surveillance
reach such an incredibly large scope, to the point where it seems pervasive,
while in fact, they only monitor the network from a few select locations? The
answer to this question is simple: the NSA’s monitoring could scale because we
are addicted to centralization.
From the physical point of view, we made ourselves absolutely dependent on
the deployed, fixed infrastructure. Whenever we communicate, the quasi to-
tality of the traffic relies upon going through a central access point of some
sort. This approach to networking certainly offers substantial advantages (a
good performance/cost compromise for starters), but on the other hand it of-
fers cheap and efficient vantage points for whoever seeks large scale monitoring
opportunities. It does not have to be so.
Similarly, from the logical point of view, we make ourselves more and more
dependent on cloud services. Whenever we store, or access our data, we rely on
a centralized architecture that concentrates everything in data centers. Again,
this approach offers great advantages (e.g. easier access from anywhere, lower
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cost reliability and efficiency), but on the other hand it offers more cheap and
efficient vantage points for would-be spies. It does not have to be so either.
2 Making Massive Surveillance Harder
At this point, it becomes apparent that there are essentially three ways to make
large scale systematic surveillance a much harder task.
The first type of solution is to significantly increase the physical security of
potential vantage points. While this type of solution is obviously necessary,
history shows that there are always cracks to infiltrate if the will to break in is
there. And it will be there. So this type of solution is by no means sufficient.
The second type of solution is to significantly increase the default levels of
encryption used over the network. For starters, the default behavior should be
to encrypt ”door-to-door” and don’t let communication be decrypted by inter-
mediate devices. Furthermore the default cryptographic mechanisms should be
significantly harder to decipher. Note that to ensure this actually happens con-
sistently, the use of open source software should be mandatory concerning such
cryptographic mechanisms. On one hand, as highlighted in [21], open-source
bundled with automatic updates can slow down or stop obsolescence altogether,
and on the other hand, open source is best known guarantee against malware
and potential backdoors. However, if one of the physical end points of the com-
munication is a vantage point of potentially high interest (say a data center),
we quickly come back to the problems of the first type of solution, i.e. there are
always cracks to infiltrate if the will to break in is there. And it will be there,
with an extremely intense focus, because this is a potential vantage point – and
with an intense focus one can do wonders.
The third type of solution is of an entirely different nature, which is the main
purpose of this document. Instead of hardening the current architecture and in-
creasing the security of high profile targets, another category of approach could
be to aim for target dispersal, as suggested recently by B. Schneier in [2]. Target
dispersal would eliminate ”default” vantage points and thus naturally disable
systematic mass surveillance. De facto, surveillance efforts would be forced to
be more specific and personalized, and thus more directly accountable for.
To that end, stateless networking approaches should be developed and employed,
i.e. approaches that do not rely on central entities (infrastructure-based), but
rather on spontaneous interaction between autonomous peer entities, as locally
as possible (topologically and/or geographically). The network architecture
should evolve towards a mode of operation where all possible stateless solutions
are tried first, before considering any infrastructure-based approach – again, the
goal being to increase target dispersal. In fact, several examples of stateless ap-
proaches have appeared over the last decade, at different layers. These include
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for instance peer-to-peer (P2P) networks or WebRTC [22] at the application
layer, and multi-hop spontaneous wireless networks at the network layer [4],
such as mobile ad hoc networks [3], wireless sensor networks, vehicular networks,
or wireless mesh networks.
While P2P networks have been massively deployed and adopted (WebRTC will
likely enjoy the same fate) spontaneous wireless networks have not yet been
widely adopted. There has however been quite some work in the research com-
munity over the past decade on this topic, which has identified issues that must
(still) be tackled in order to efficiently adapt IP protocols for these new net-
works. Actually, the community has already produced a number of new protocol
specifications dedicated to spontaneous wireless networking operation, such as
[5] [6] [9], [13] among others. Some of these protocols have even been deployed
in specific contexts. Several european and american military applications have
deployed using mobile ad hoc routing to power spontaneous, on-the-move local
communications between elements on-site. In another context, several cities in
Europe and in the USA have deployed wireless community mesh networks (e.g.
[18] [19]), which use these protocols. Last, but not least, the highly anticipated
Internet of Things (IoT) is heavily based on spontaneous wireless networking
and the outcome of efforts such as 6LoWPAN [14] or ROLL [15].
Indeed, merging spontaneous wireless networks with traditional, operated net-
works presents a number of advantages, aside of target dispersal to counter
massive surveillance. First, it could offer operator infrastructure offloading [20].
Second, the resulting network would systematically maximize connectivity at
marginal cost. Third, it offers natural coverage extension for the network access
infrastructure already deployed. And last, it offers increased resilience of the
network in face of infrastructure outage.
There are of course lingering issues that do not allow off-the-shelf, spontaneous
wireless networking at large scale. Among others, such issues include (i) the ab-
sence of efficient standard router auto-configuration schemes in this context [12],
which has profound implications, (ii) the lack of dedicated, optimized link layer
technology (which has focused on infrastructure based networking for decades),
(iii) no standard key exchange protocol or alternatives for efficient authentica-
tion method to date, and (iv) some fundamental differences in terms of char-
acteristics compared to traditional networks, such as throughput capacity vs
number of nodes in the network.
However, in light of the recent events revealing massive and systematic surveil-
lance [1], there is a strong argument to decentralize our networking paradigms,
and in this realm, spontaneous wireless networking at the networks layer is an as-
set that should not be overlooked. Contrary to infrastructure-based approaches,
which are prone to monitoring, spontaneous wireless networking uses commu-
nication links that are local and volatile, i.e. unless one is physically present
at the time and location of the communication, one must abandon all hope of
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monitoring anything. While the wireless nature of the communication may on
the other hand facilitate eavesdropping, the fact that one has to be there at the
time/place of the communication significantly hampers mass surveillance, and
cryptographic techniques can provide a privacy equivalent to what is achieved
on wire. The honest, technical question that we should ask ourselves at this
point is: are the lingering issues of spontaneous wireless networking integration
in the IP stack worth solving/improving or not, taking into account our goal to
maximize surveillance target dispersal?
3 Position: More Spontaneity Please
The position highlighted in this paper is that in order to maximize target dis-
persal to counter systematic massive surveillance, we should not overlook the
full potential of decentralized network paradigms. This full potential includes
not only mantras such as ”think hard before you use the cloud”, or ”let’s bypass
the service provider” but also alternative techniques at the network layer, such
as multi-hop spontaneous wireless networking, which could significantly reduce
our dependence on the infrastructure – which will remain, whether we want it
or not, a desirable vantage point for mass monitoring. There are a number of
issues that need to be resolved or alleviated towards native and massive integra-
tion of spontaneous wireless networks in the currently deployed IP architecture
and infrastructure-based networks (massive IPv6 adoption could already help
somewhat). However, the gains obtained in terms of target dispersal alone could
be worth this cost – and there are other gains too.
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